Abstract-We link data on racial self-identification with changes in statelevel affirmative action policies to ask whether racial self-identification responds to economic incentives. We find that after a state bans affirmative action, multiracial individuals who face an incentive to identify under affirmative action are about 30% less likely to identify with their minority group. In contrast, multiracial individuals who face a disincentive to identify under affirmative action are roughly 20% more likely to identify with their minority group once affirmative action policies are banned.
I. Introduction
S URVEYS almost always rely on individual self-reports to identify a person's race. What is often overlooked, however, is that individuals must weigh the costs and benefits of associating themselves with minority groups when forming and reporting their own identities. While research has modeled the choice of racial identity (Darity, Mason, & Stewart, 2006) , empirical studies in this field typically describe the factors that are correlated with a choice of racial or ethnic identity (Duncan & Trejo, 2011) . In this paper, we investigate the causal question by asking whether populations subject to exogenous changes in returns to racial identity demonstrate changes in selfreported racial identification. 1 To this end, we use large-scale U.S. surveys to compare an individual's report of his or her ancestral origins with willingness to identify as a member of a minority group. This produces rates of racial identification that we connect with variation in economic incentives to identify as racial minorities. For the latter, we follow Hinrichs (2012) in exploiting variation in state-level affirmative action bans that went into effect beginning in the late 1990s.
We view affirmative action as an effort to make the racial and ethnic makeup of institutions such as universities or state agencies more closely resemble that of the underlying population. This implies that while affirmative action policies are in effect, underrepresented racial minorities will have a greater incentive to identify with their minority group relative to racial groups that may be minorities within the population at large but are overrepresented at institutions (overrepresented minority groups). Thus, once state affirmative action policies are banned, members of underrepresented minority groups will face a reduced incentive to identify, and members of overrepresented minority groups will face a greater incentive to identify. To make these notions concrete, the analysis here focuses on black/African American self-identification as an example of the former case and Asian/Asian American self-identification as an example of the latter. This approach is supported by evidence that affirmative action is perceived to benefit individuals identifying as African American (Rockquemore & Arend, 2002) and penalize those identifying as Asian American (Espenshade, Chung, & Walling, 2004) . We also investigate whether multiracial individuals in particular are more likely to respond to policy incentives, as they have an additional racial identity from which to choose and may have greater range in how others view them (Rockquemore & Arend, 2002) . We find that multiracial individuals who report having black ancestry are less likely to identify themselves as black once the state is barred from using affirmative action. In contrast, individuals with Asian ancestry are more likely to identify their race as Asian once affirmative action is banned. Table 1 lists the years and states in which affirmative action bans were passed and implemented (Hinrichs, 2012; Lohrentz, 2007) . These policy changes stemmed largely from statewide voter initiatives designed to eliminate racial preferences by state institutions in government hiring, contracting, and admission to public colleges and universities.
II. Data
The data on self-reported racial identity and ancestry come from the 5% public use samples of the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, as well as the 2001-2011 American Community Survey (ACS).
2 Since these data were not collected with the expectation of any reward or penalty, they are arguably more likely to elicit an individual's authentic view of self, in particular when compared with data culled from educational or employment applications. Thus, we interpret these results as a lower bound of the degree of racial switching we would find in a high-stakes survey environment. At the same time, there may be some disconnect between a respondent's self-perceptions and responses to any survey; thus, at a minimum, the results suggest that racial selfreports, if not self-identification, respond to economic incentives.
The outcome variable in the analysis is the individual's race, as reported by the survey respondent.
3 The survey instructions read: ''The concept of race, as used by the Census Bureau, reflects selfidentification by individuals according to the race or races with which they identify'' (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011 Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2013) , who show that Brazilians changed their self-reported racial identities following the adoption of racial quotas in university admissions.
2 These data are publicly available through the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) at http://usa.ipums.org/usa/. All of our samples exclude individuals with an allocated race or Hispanic origin and include only U.S.-born individuals.
3 The use of the term self-identification throughout this paper assumes that the respondent is answering the question as intended and reporting the race(s) with which the individual identifies, as opposed to how the respondent views the individual. Even if this were not the case, however, our analysis could still be interpreted to demonstrate that the racial groups to which individuals are assigned by close relations may shift in response to policy changes. For example, the results for young children could easily be reframed to show how policy incentives affect how parents view the racial identities of their children, which are important components of those children's ultimate self-identification. options, among others. 4 We view all selections indicating an Asian race as consistent with a self-reported Asian identity and all selections indicating a black/African American race as consistent with a selfreported black identity.
We also take advantage of information on the individual's ancestry or ethnic origin. The instructions read: ''Ancestry refers to the person's ethnic origin or descent, 'roots,' or heritage. Ancestry may also refer to the country of birth of the person or the person's parents or ancestors before their arrival in the United States'' (U.S. Census Bureau 2011). Respondents are allowed to list multiple ancestries, and in all years, our data sources report the first two ancestries listed.
As suggested by the survey instructions, we treat the ancestry response as an objective representation of the individual's racial and ethnic heritage, whereas the race question asks about the racial groups with which the individual subjectively chooses to identify. We further use the ancestry information to characterize individuals as having black or Asian ancestries based on whether the ancestry originated in Africa or Asia, respectively.
5 This characterization allows us to break down the sample used in each regression into three mutually exhaustive categories based on whether the individual reported (a) nonrelevant ancestry, (b) one relevant ancestry and one nonrelevant ancestry (denoted as multiracial individuals), or (c) only relevant ancestry. This allows us to investigate whether multiracial individuals are the most responsive to changes in policy incentives. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the sample, linking the ancestry response with self-reported race. While the great majority of individuals who report only having black ancestry identify themselves as black (99.3%), a dramatically lower fraction of individuals reporting one black and one nonblack ancestry (denoted here as multiracial blacks) actually identify as black (49.4%). This contrasts sharply with the purported ''one-drop'' rule in which individuals with any black ancestry are considered to be black. The analogous share of multiracial individuals with Asian ancestry who identify as Asian (64%) is also much lower than for those with only Asian ancestry (93.65%). While the absolute number of multiracial individuals is much smaller compared with the number of monoracial individuals, Census projections confirm that multiracial individuals are the fastest-growing segment of the population and are expected to more than triple over the next forty years (U.S. Census, 2012).
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate variation in these rates of self-identification for individuals living in states that passed an affirmative action ban within our sample period. 6 Most striking, figure 1 shows that multiracial individuals with both black and nonblack ancestry display much lower rates of black identification once affirmative action is banned. In contrast, a pattern of rising rates of Asian identification for individuals with Asian ancestry is documented in figure 2, albeit less dramatic than for black respondents.
III. Empirical Strategy
We investigate the relationship between state-level affirmative action bans and self-reported racial identity in a difference-in-differences research design that follows Hinrichs (2012) :
where Identifies ist is a dummy variable equal to 1 if person i in state s and year t identifies with that racial identity (e.g., black) and 0 otherwise, and ban st is a dummy variable equal to 1 if state s has an affirmative action ban in year t and 0 otherwise. The dummy variables NoRelevantAncestry ist , MultiracialRelevantAncestry ist , and OnlyRelevantAncestry ist are mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories for no relevant ancestry reported, one relevant ancestry, and one nonrelevant ancestry reported (denoted as multiracial individuals), and only relevant ancestry reported, respectively. p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 represent the association between an affirmative action ban and the racial identity of those with varying ties to the relevant ancestry. All regressions include state fixed effects (m s ), year fixed effects (d t ), and state-specific linear time trends (y s t). X ist includes controls for age and gender, the fraction of the state population that is foreign born, and the fractions of the state population that are black, Hispanic, and Asian. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Table 3 presents the results from the regression above with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the individual identifies as black/African American. Each column reports results from a regression on a separate age group. While we interpret the differences across columns as heterogeneous age effects, these differences could also reflect cohort effects. The magnitudes of the coefficients suggest that for children with black and nonblack ancestry, banning affirmative action reduces the likelihood of identifying him or her as black by about 15 percentage points. Since the overall rate of self-identification for multiracial black individuals is just under 50% (table 2), this is close to a 30% drop.
IV. Results
In an analogous model, table 4 shows that individuals reporting any Asian ancestry are more likely to identify as Asian once affirmative action is banned. In particular, multiracial Asian children are about 14 to 15 percentage points more likely to identify as Asian when affirmative action policies are banned. Comparing this to the 64% of multiracial Asians who identified as Asian (table 2), we see that the relative magnitude is again large (about 23%). In both tables, we note that the coefficients for those with no relevant ancestry or those with only relevant ancestry are much smaller, consistent with 5 The IPUMS data center facilitates this characterization by grouping responses into African-origin and Asian-origin groups that are consistent across years. 6 Arizona and Texas are excluded from the graph because the timing of their bans does not allow for clean pre-and postban trends. the notion that multiracial individuals have a greater capacity to choose between racial identities. Additional robustness checks available in the online appendix provide support for the parallel trends assumption, suggesting that these results are not driven by preexisting trends as the impacts were not observed until the bans went into effect.
7
To provide further support for the mechanism driving the observed estimates, table 5 explores whether results for 18-to 25-year-olds currently enrolled in college display a greater response than those not enrolled in college. For individuals reporting Asian ancestry, the results look largely similar regardless of college attendance. For individuals with multiracial black ancestry, however, the results suggest that the striking decline in the probability multiracial individuals identify as black among 18-to 25-year-olds is driven by a 19 percentage point drop by those individuals enrolled in college. This supports the view that affirmative action policies in higher education in Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. The samples include U.S.-born individuals in the indicated age range. Individuals with an allocated race or Hispanic origin are excluded. All regressions include controls for age and gender; the fraction of the state population that is foreign born; the fraction of the state population that is black, Hispanic, and Asian; state and year fixed effects; and statespecific linear time trends. Controls for multiracial and only relevant ancestry are also included as level effects. No relevant ancestry, multiracial-relevant ancestry, and only relevant ancestry are mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. Statistically significant at *10%, **5%, *** 1%. 1990 and 2000 Census Data, 2001 -2011 7 The online appendix also shows the results are robust to concerns regarding selective interstate migration and the use of the 1990 Census sample.
particular have an important impact on patterns of racial identification.
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V. Conclusion
Rather than being born into a fixed racial identity, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that individuals may shift their selfreported identities in response to economic incentives. Consistent with a diminished incentive to identify as an underrepresented racial minority, we find that multiracial individuals with some black ancestry are about 30% less likely to identify as black once affirmative action policies are banned. In contrast, multiracial individuals with some Asian ancestry are about 20% more likely to identify as Asian once the bans are implemented. Nevertheless, because the biggest response comes from multiracial individuals and each of these groups represents a relatively small portion of the black and Asian ancestry samples, it is unlikely that the effects seen here result in any significant distortions in demographic trends in the near term.
9 As the group of multiracial individuals continues to grow rapidly, however, and affirmative action policies continue to be struck down, this may present cause for concern in the future. The samples include U.S.-born individuals aged 18 to 25 with a high school or GED degree, but not a bachelor's degree. See additional notes below table 3. Statistically significant at *10%, **5%, *** 1%. 1990 and 2000 Census Data, 2001 -2011 We investigate additional heterogeneity in outcomes in the online appendix, including effects by poverty status and parental education. Results do not indicate notable variation along these margins. 9 We address the possibility that they may result in a misrepresentation of racial disparities in the online appendix.
